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Explaining the success of pensioners’ parties:  
A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 31 European democracies 
Introduction 
Over the past two decades small pensioners’ and retirees’ parties have emerged at the 
margins of political systems both in Western Europe and in the new democracies of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Such ‘grey interest’ parties appear, at first examination, a 
fringe phenomenon of little interest and have usually been passed over as inconsequential 
by most writers on the politics of old ageing societies because they lack the potential to 
attract mass electoral support or sharply realign political competition on age- or 
generational lines (Walker 1998; Goerres 2009: 71-2).  
However, like many minor political groupings, grey interest parties merit comparative 
political science examination. Grey interest parties are more widespread and persistent 
than other localized, ephemeral minor party phenomena and, in a small number of 
European states have enjoyed sufficient success to exercise real electoral and political 
leverage.  Most typically, this has taken the form of forcing larger parties to address 
demands of politicians or constituencies on discontented older and retired people, which 
they might otherwise ignore. In rarer cases grey interest parties have gained 
parliamentary and governmental influence in their own right. Moreover, ongoing 
population ageing in Europe suggests that, all other things being equal, grey interest 
parties should have some growth potential simply because they can draw on a growing 
reservoir of elderly target voters.  
This chapter maps the emergence and success of pensioners’ parties in both established 
Western European democracies and in the newer post-communist democracies of Central 
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and Eastern Europe. It then considers potential reasons for the emergence and, in some 
cases, the relative success this type of party, examining both the ‘demand’ for pensioners’ 
parties that might be generated by demographic change and patterns of welfare spending 
and the regulation of their ‘supply’ by national political opportunity structures.  It then 
compares the fortunes of grey interest parties in contemporary Europe using an 
application Charles Ragin’s Qualitative Comparative Analysis technique to see if any 
patterns of systematic variation can be identified. The chapter concludes by discussing 
these results and suggesting further avenues for research.  
 
The emergence of pensioners’ parties 
In Western Europe pensioners parties emerged as a fringe phenomenon in late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Following Goerres (2009: 71), I take a pensioners’ or ‘grey interest’ party to 
be any organization contesting (or planning to contest) elections which signals through its 
name and/or founding documentation that it seeks mainly to represent the interests of 
pensioners and older voters. With the exception of Luxembourg’s Alternative Democratic 
Reform (ADR) party, discussed later in the chapter, this enables the relatively 
unproblematic identification of such parties. As appendix table 1 shows, the first 
pensioners’ party to emerge in a Western democracy for which firm evidence is available 
was founded in Israel in 1981 (Iecovich 2002). The first grey party to emerge in Western 
Europe proper was Italy’s Partito dei Pensionati (PP) founded in 1987. Shortly 
afterwards pensioners’ parties were formed in Germany, Scandinavia and the Benelux 
countries. More recently, pensioners’ parties have also emerged in the United Kingdom. 
It appears that only three West European countries in the old (pre-2004) EU saw no 
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pensioners’ parties form: France, Ireland and Iceland.  Grey interest groupings also 
formed widely in post-communist democracies in CEE, the earliest emerging in the early-
mid 1990s with others more recently forming in Russia, Ukraine and South East 
European states such Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia and Bulgaria. In post-communist Europe 
pensioners’ parties seem to have been wholly absent only in Albania, Lithuania and 
Moldova. 
In both Western and Eastern Europe pensioners’ parties have generally been peripheral 
and, very often, ephemeral phenomenon. Many, especially in Western Europe, have 
gained almost no electoral support at national level. Others, especially in certain East 
European cases (Czech Republic 1992, 1996, 1998; Estonia 1993; Poland 1997) have 
performed more credibly as niche groupings, gaining 1-3 per cent of the vote in national 
elections. In a small number of countries including the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Israel, 
Slovenia and Croatia, however, grey interest parties have exceeded this level of support 
and gained national parliamentary representation. Several of these have entered 
government as junior coalition partners: Israel’s GIL party, which entered the Knesset in 
2006, was a junior partner in the Kadima-led  government before exiting parliament in 
2009; the Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS) has been a partner in 
governments of left and right for more than a decade, while the United Party of 
Pensioners of Serbia (PUPS) entered parliament in 2007 on a joint electoral list with the 
Socialist Party and became a junior partner of the pro-European administration of Prime 
Minister Mirko Ćetković (Hanley 2010).  
In this chapter I compare the relative success of grey interest parties in 31 European 
democracies: the  15 established (pre-2004) West European members of the European 
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Union; Switzerland, Norway and Iceland; the ten new Central and East Europe members 
states, which joined the EU in 2004-7 and Croatia, an advanced EU candidate state likely 
to join the Union in 2010-11. I additionally include the cases of Israel and Scotland as 
polities comparable to full EU member states which have seen the development of 
important grey interest parties.
1
 As grey interest parties in Western Europe are essentially 
a phenomenon of the last two decades and to enhance comparability with Central and 
Eastern Europe where democratic systems have existed since the fall of communism, I 
examine relevant parties in the period 1990-2008, focusing on elections to lower houses 
of national legislatures, which are usually key to the exercise of national political power.
2
 
To examine the relative success of pensioners’ parties, I employ a form of Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA), a comparative technique, which seeks to formalize the 
logic of qualitative case-based comparison by identifying relevant configurations of 
causes (conditions) and effects (outcomes) using the logic of Boolean algebra and set 
theory (Ragin 1987, 2000; Rihoux and Ragin 2009). Although the comparative analysis 
of sometimes transient minor party phenomena poses many challenges, QCA is among 
the best suited approaches to such a task. As well as avoiding the problems of high 
collinarity sometimes encountered by conventional multivariate analysis, QCA allows the 
identification of different configurations of factors (causal pathways), which produce 
similar outcomes and enables the researcher to revisit empirical judgments used to code 
cases. QCA is thus particularly well suited to an analysis of the emergence of group of 
minor parties across a diverse range of cases (Redding and Viterna 1999; Veuglers and 
Magnan 2005). 
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I initially use the Fuzzy Set form of QCA (fsQCA) which defines cases in terms of 
degrees of membership in outcomes of interest and causal variables (conditions). Degrees 
of membership are expressed as a score ranging from 1.0 (full membership) to 0.0 (full 
non-membership) with a ‘crossover value’ of maximum ambiguity set at 0.5. Such 
scoring of fuzzy set memberships is based on the researcher’s theoretically-driven 
understanding of concepts and categories and empirical knowledge of cases. Later in the 
chapter, an additional form of analysis, I also make use of the original Crisp Set version 
of QCA (csQCA), which sees causes and outcomes simply as dichotomously present or 
absent. The process QCA analysis using both forms of the technique is explained more 
fully in the final part of the chapter. 
 
Defining a ‘successful’ grey interest party: condition GREYP 
There are strong reasons to expect that grey interest parties will not emerge as major 
political actors and a fortiori, that they will not bring about any realignment of party 
systems on age-based lines. In European contexts age and retirement status have never 
been strong or salient political identities. Like other groups, older and retired voters are, 
moreover, also differentiated by cross-cutting divisions of class, education, ethnicity or 
region and their retirement and pension status can differ markedly in consequence of 
previous employment status. Additionally, older voters may already have established 
strong political identities and identifications, developed over the greater part of a 
lifetime.
3
 They also retain social and family ties to members other age groups, which will 
impede the politicization of (supposed) conflicts between the interests of different 
generations. Emergent grey interest parties are also likely to meet with forceful 
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competition from established parties and, if they begin to win support, powerful directly 
targeted counter-responses.  The large number of seniors in European electorates gives 
established parties a strong motivation to target policies at older voters (Goerres 2009: 
72) and the (erroneous) notion of a powerful dormant ‘grey vote’ is already established in 
the discourse of many European democracies and assimilated by many established 
politicians (Goerres 2008, 2009; Tepe and Vanhuysse 2009).  
The political science literature contains few criteria for defining what success might mean 
for a minor party.
4
  Minor party ‘success’ has variously been defined in terms of crossing 
electoral thresholds or polling a certain (mean) vote over a certain period. Drawing on 
this work (Harmel and Robertson 1985: 511-3; Kitschelt 1989; Redding and Viterna 
1998), I therefore take as full members of the set of ‘successful’ grey interest parties 
groupings such as Luxembourg’s ADR or Slovenia’s DeSUS, which have had sustained 
minor party success by polling 4 per cent of the national vote in two or more 
parliamentary elections (coded as 1.0). However, as interest parties’ emergence and 
success is often episodic I also categorize ‘flash’ parties, such as GIL or Holland’s AOV, 
which enjoyed some minor party success by polling more than 4 per cent on at least one 
occasion as almost entirely in the set of successful grey interest parties. I code these 
parties 0.8 or 0.9 depending on whether they substantially exceed 4 per cent. Conversely, 
cases where pensioners’ parties have either never formed or never independently 
contested any national parliamentary elections were deemed fully or almost fully out of 
the set and were coded respectively 0 or 0.1 Pensioners’ parties, which have contested 
parliamentary elections but always received negligible electoral support (less than 1 per 
cent) are coded 0.25 where they had had repeatedly contested elections (Sweden, 
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Norway, Germany, Finland) and 0.2 where they had not (Belgium). The crossover value 
(0.5) of ambiguous minor party success was set at 2 per cent, although empirically all but 
cases fell clearly either side of this value.  Cases where grey interest parties had come 
close to success by polling close to 4 per cent on one occasion (Estonia, Holland, Poland) 
were coded 0.6. There was one distinct case (the Czech Republic) where a grey interest 
party had polled 3 per cent over three successive parliamentary elections. This I coded 
0.8. Of the cases falling somewhat below the crossover point, the Scottish Senior 
Citizens’ Unity Party which polled low electoral support 1.4  per cent in successive 
Scottish election had short-lived parliamentary representation, was coded 0.40 Where 
rival pensioners’ groupings contested an election, I take the combined score for such grey 
interest groupings. In QCA notation, I term the degree of success of a pensioners’ party 
or parties GREYP. 
 
Explaining the emergence of pensioners’ parties 
Why have pensioners’ parties emerged?  And why have some been relatively successful 
as minor parties while others have remained insignificant fringe groupings? There is a 
large academic literature on the emergence of new parties in Europe largely inspired by 
the rise of the Greens and the radical right in Western European party systems in 1970s 
and 1980s and, more recently, by the emergence of new parties in the more unstable party 
systems of Central and Eastern Europe (Sikk 2005; Tavits 2007).  
Explanations rooted in the experience of Western Europe have generally taken a 
sociological approach emphasizing the emergence of voter demands for new policies, 
which result from long-term changes in socio-economic, demographic and family 
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structures Perhaps the best known examples of such sociologically based explanations of 
new party development was the hypothesis  that a growing left-libertarian constituency of 
voters with ‘post-material’ values brought into existence by changes in production, 
employment and welfare patterns and rising living standards and educational levels had 
driven the rise of Green parties in Western Europe (Kitschelt 1989; Müller-Rommel 
1989). 
More recent work informed by the experience of Central and East Europe, however, 
stresses conjunctural and institutional factors such as electoral systems, party system 
formats, the broader progress of reform or public dissatisfaction with conventional parties 
as more important drivers of new party development (Sikk 2005, 2006; Tavits 2006, 
2007; Pop-Eleches 2010). In this perspective, even when they may appear otherwise, new 
parties are less expressions of long-term social trends creating new party families, than 
exercises in successful political entrepreneurship backed by a favourable conjuncture of 
unrelated interests.
5
 
Both literatures broadly agree, however, that three sets of causes and/or conditions are 
relevant for new party emergence: 1) new or unmet social and electoral demands for 
representation, stemming from deeply rooted ‘social strains’; 2) a favourable set of 
‘political opportunity structures’ presented by patterns of political competition and 
political institutions (Kitschelt 1989; Redding and Viterna 1999); and 3) the mobilization 
and effective co-ordination of adequate resources.  Given the marked regional split 
between the historical and political experiences of Western and Eastern Europe – also 
evident in the preoccupations of the different strands of the literature on new party 
development - I add an additional regional condition to allow for differences between 
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West European and East European contexts not covered in the general explanatory 
conditions discussed. The following sections elaborate how these three broad 
explanations might be applied to the development of pensioners’ parties in contemporary 
European democracies and operationalized for QCA analysis. 
 
Growing electoral constituencies of inactive 50-plussers: condition RETIRPOP  
The most simple socio-structural factor that might explain the emergence of pensioner s’ 
parties is the growing number of older and retired people in all European societies, both 
absolutely and as a proportion of overall population (see Goerres and Vanhuysse, this 
volume).  A higher number of older and/or retired citizens might generate both greater 
resource demands and greater demands for participation by older people leading to a 
more radical ‘politics of old age’ (Walker 1998). However, it is not always clear to what 
extent such growing ‘grey’ constituencies are defined by age, by work (retirement) status 
and/or by receipt of pension benefits. Much research on ‘grey’ politics or the ‘greying’ of 
democracy takes the proportion of older citizens aged over 60 or 65 as roughly equivalent 
to levels of retirement. However, in some social contexts, there is only a very slight 
correlation between demographic ageing and the proportion of retired people in the 
population. This is markedly the case with post-1989 Eastern Europe, where communist 
welfare systems set comparatively low formal retirement ages and generous early 
retirement policies after 1989, intended to facilitate industrial restructuring and pre-empt 
social discontent, led to an artificial ‘pensioner boom’ in some states the in early and mid 
1990s (Vanhuysse 2006, 2009). Even in many West European states there is considerable 
divergence between numbers of older people and numbers of retired people (Tepe and 
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Vanhuysse 2009). It therefore seems best to use an indicator of the size of  potential’ 
grey’ constituency based on numbers of retirees, rather than numbers of people aged over 
60 or 65. This arguably captures processes of demographic ageing as filtered through 
varying political and social context(s) or the specificities of national pension policies.  
Systematic comparative cross-national data on numbers of (old age) pensioners in Europe 
in the past two decades are difficult to obtain. Moreover, the strategic use of sickness and 
invalidity benefit as a form of compensation for unemployment in many East European 
countries may mean that, even when formally comparable, figures have very different 
meanings. To address this issue, I use EU Labour Force Survey data to calculate average 
percentages of economically inactive citizens aged over 50 in the adult populations of EU 
member states and Croatia in the period 1990 – 2007. Although this category does not 
precisely coincide with that of pensioners – as some pensioners will continue to be 
economically active, while some economically inactive older people may lack pension 
entitlements - this figure can be taken as a reasonable approximation of relative numbers 
of retirees and pre-retirees and broadly coincides with the patterns suggested available 
cross-national data for numbers of retired people in the EU27 (in 2001) compiled by 
Eurostat (Kubitza 2004).
6
 This measure also makes the hypothetical assumption that 
(some) pre-retirees will behave in politically similar way to retired people – that is  to say 
that, anticipating retired status,  some will  be attracted to grey interest parties in similar 
numbers and for similar reasons to those already retired. 
7
 Obtaining fully comparable 
data for Israel is problematic. However, available evidence suggests that proportions of 
retired people, pension beneficiaries and older people in Israel are all low relative to 
European cases analyzed (Gamliel-Yehoshou and Vanhuysse 2010).  
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At what level might such differences be consequential for the fortunes of grey interest 
parties? Available case-based evidence suggests that a well led grey interest party, which 
has solved resource mobilization and collective action problems, can in practice garner 
the votes of 10-15 per cent of its target constituency.
8
 For the purpose of this chapter I 
therefore assume that grey interest parties can realistically obtain voters of one in eight of 
their target constituency.
9
 To be confident of gaining 4 per cent of the national vote 
needed to establish itself as a successful minor party, a grey interest party relying 
essentially on the support of retired voters would therefore need a total retired population 
forming around a third of the adult population. Conversely, if pensioners and retirees 
formed too small a proportion of the adult population, even the best led grey interest 
party would have little prospect of gaining sufficient support to move beyond fringe party 
status. For fsQCA purposes I therefore coded states where inactive citizens aged 50 or 
above were estimated to form at least 35 per cent of the adult population as fully in the 
set of states with a politically consequential electoral constituency for grey parties (1.0) 
and states where this group formed less than 10 per cent as fully out of this set (0, full 
non-membership).  The latter proportion of pensioners would equate to a vote of less than 
one per cent even for the most effectively organized grey interest party. I set the 
crossover point between full membership and full non-membership in the set of states 
with a politically consequential constituency for grey parties at 22.5 per cent of 
economically inactive 50-plussers in the adult population. In QCA notation I term this 
condition RETIRPOP. 
 
Greying welfare states and insider interests: condition PENEXP 
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In industrial and post-industrial societies, the welfare state is a key mechanism shaping 
socio-political interests and identities (Campbell 2003). In Western Europe from the 
1980s, the focus of welfare politics shifted from claims for increased resources and 
representation in an extensive and expanding welfare state to a ‘new politics of welfare’ 
centring on retrenchment programmes in a context of reduced public spending and 
pressures for structural welfare and pension reforms (Pierson 1996; Tepe and Vanhuysse, 
this volume; for reviews see Vanhuysse 2001 and Green-Pedersen and Haverland 2002).  
This new politics of welfare in West European states been hypothesized as generating 
anti-(neo-)liberal distributional demands for the retention of post-war social democratic 
or social market status quo (Kitschelt 2004)
10
 and as creating - or adding to - generational 
and sectoral divisions, which crosscut and fragment traditional class groupings. 
Generationally-based conflicts are said to emerged through the interaction and mutual 
reinforcement of established welfare and health institutions and a powerful ‘grey lobby’ 
able to outcompete other  groups (for example, families with children or the working 
poor) facing so-called New Social Risks stemming from deregulated labour markets, 
more intermittent employment and greater labour market participation of women.  In this 
perspective, current pensioners’ interests in maintaining existing levels and forms of 
pension and welfare provision might be seen as opposing them to younger groups 
impacted by New Social Risks who have an interest in reformed welfare states (Bonoli 
2004, Tepe and Vanhuysse 2010).
 11
 
Integrating post-communist welfare states in Central and East Europe into the broader 
European picture poses significant problems of comparability. Post-communist era 
welfare states are very distinct institutions shaped by contradictory impulses and crosscut 
 13 
by multiple legacies (Chandler 2004; Bazant and Schubert 2009; Cerami and Vanhuysse 
2009; Inglot 2009). Both communist and post-communist welfare policies varied 
significantly from those in Western Europe. However, as in Western Europe, post-
communist CEE welfare states faced retrenchment and reform in the context of market-
oriented liberal reforms (Pop and Vanhuysse 2004, Cerami and Vanhyusse 2009), 
including debates on restructuring mature pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems schemes. 
The processes (potentially) generating a socio-political constituency of grey ‘insiders’ in 
(some) West European states also find certain parallels in post-communist Central and 
East Europe. As a group with low fixed, state-provided incomes who used public health 
and welfare services more intensively, pensioners in the region were - or might perceive 
themselves as - one of the groups potentially most heavily impacted by budgetary 
pressures and scaling back of public and welfare services. In an echo of sectoral and 
generational interest conflicts in Western Europe, they thus had an interest in competing 
for scarce welfare resources against newly emergent constituencies of ‘losers’ in the 
process of market reform such as the unemployed, poorer families. As in Western 
Europe, CEE politicians were aware of population ageing particularly and fearful an 
electoral backlash from older voters, if their living standards deteriorated. Such dynamics 
were exaggerated in CEE states, such as Hungary and Poland, which experienced 
artificial ‘pensioner booms’ in early-mid 1990s, which reinforced the status of pensioners 
as an insider group by rapidly making them a sizeable and electorally influential 
constituency (Vanhuysse 2006).  
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Despite this, it seems clear that the argument regarding the potential for age-based 
conflicts of interests rooted in the welfare state rests on the notion of current cohorts of 
older people and retirees as an ‘insider’ group defending current entitlements against 
challenge by policy-makers, current workers and other welfare state client groups, rather 
than an outsider group making new demands (see also the chapters by Sciubba and by 
Hering in this volume).  Some broad measure of the age-bias or pensioner-bias of current 
welfare state provision would therefore seem the best means of capturing this condition.
12
 
As crude measure of such bias,
13
 I therefore take the mean proportion of pension 
spending in total spending on social protection in the period as measure in available 
Eurostat data.
14
 Taking Italy as a paradigmatic case of an elderly-biased welfare state 
(Lynch 2006), I take states with mean pension spending of 60 per cent of social spending 
as fully in the set of European welfare states with a strong bias towards older age groups 
and current retirees (1.0). Conversely, I take states where mean pension spending was 25 
per cent or less of social spending as fully out of the set (0.0). In the absence of a 
compelling theoretical argument or a natural break point, the crossover value was set at 
42.5 per cent, the mid-point between full membership and non-membership. I then coded 
cases continuously and termed this condition in QCA notation PENEXP.
15
 
 
Permissiveness of electoral systems: condition THRESH 
Research on new party emergence suggests that the most significant formal institutional 
factor influencing new party success is the electoral system (Tavits 2006; Veuglers and 
Magnan 2005). Electoral systems affect emergent parties both directly by determining the 
effective threshold of electoral support needed to gain parliamentary representation and 
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indirectly by signalling to supporters the level of risk they are running that their votes 
may go unrepresented. There is less agreement as to how to measure and operationalize 
where such thresholds lie. Where formal national electoral thresholds for representation 
exist, as in much of Eastern Europe, these can straightforwardly be taken as the practical 
threshold faced small emergent parties. Where, as in many West European cases, no 
formal thresholds exist, I calculate the permissiveness of an electoral system using 
Taagepera's  (2002) formula to estimate the effective national threshold of support an 
emergent party must approach to be credible.
16
 For the purposes of fsQCA I take 
electoral systems with a practical threshold of 0.5 per cent or less as fully in the set of 
highly permissive electoral systems and those with a practical threshold of 6 per cent or 
above as fully out of the set. The crossover value was set a 3.25 per cent. In QCA 
notation I termed this condition THRESH.
17
   
 
Party system fluidity: NEWP 
Less formalized political institutions such as patterns of party competition and party 
system format also constitute an important facet of the opportunity structures facing 
emergent new minor parties. Some researchers on Western Europe have, for example, 
argued that new small parties find it easier to enter party systems where small parties are 
routinely required as a coalition partners by larger, established parties (Smith 1991; Mair 
1991). More broadly, high levels of party system fragmentation and electoral volatility 
(lack of party loyalty and identification among voters) should offer a more permissive 
environment of party competition. However, any attempt to assess this on a Europe-wide 
basis faces a significant difficulty rooted in differences between established West 
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European party systems and those in newer democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Conventional benchmarks of party system instability and openness or electoral volatility 
such as the Pedersen index are problematic to apply to the CEE region, where parties 
have been subject to frequent splits and mergers, changes of name and shifts in political 
position. Apparent volatility may thus be as much an elite-driven process as the product 
of changes in a fluid electorate (Birch 2001; Sikk 2005). In some CEE democracies 
Moreover, such measures of volatility and fragmentation do little to distinguish between 
large voter shifts between established parties and a more open, unstable electorate willing 
and able to turn to new challengers. Sikk (2005) therefore argues for using support for 
‘genuinely new parties’ is as an alternative measure of party system openness and 
underlying electoral volatility.
18
 This measure is also highly suitable as an approximate 
measure for gauging the opportunities facing of newly emergent party types which may 
draw on anti-establishment protest votes in both Western and Eastern. I therefore use 
levels of new party success as a measure of the openness of party competition in the cases 
under review. Although in instances pensioners’ parties have themselves been new 
parties contributing to the NEWP scoring,  they contribution is too negligible to pose 
problems of tautology:  the vote shares of new grey interest parties make up a mere 2.8 
per cent of the combined vote shares for new parties in the relevant period. 
I gauge new party success by calculating mean level of electoral support gained at 
parliamentary elections between 1990 and 2007 by new parties using Tavits’ (2007) 
definitions and calculations data, updated to included parliamentary elections after 2005, 
which she does not include in her data set (Tavits 2007.).
19
 I additionally make 
calculations or estimations for West European cases and Croatia. I code cases with mean 
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support of 12 per cent or more for new parties as fully in the set of cases with a high 
demand for new parties (1.0). Although there are instances of new parties emerging ex 
nihilo as major electoral actors (Israel 2006, Italy 1994, several recent elections in the 
Baltic states) most successful new entrants emerge as minor parties. Mean new party 
support of 12 per cent, suggesting scope for the emergence of two or three new parties, 
could therefore be taken as highly favourable for the initial emergence of a small interest 
based grouping such as a pensioners’ party (although, as with other parties, such a fluid 
political environment might militate against consolidating any initial success). On logical 
grounds I take (hypothetical) cases with 0 per cent support for new parties as wholly out 
of the set.  I place the crossover point at 6 per cent, a figure which - if voter demand is 
focused by other factors – could a sufficient general level of new party success to be a 
make a rising new political contender credible in the eyes of potential voters. In QCA 
notation I term this condition NEWP. 
 
Resource mobilization and co-ordination: condition SELF 
Social demand and institutional opportunities are, however, in themselves insufficient to 
explain new party emergence without a considering the micro-foundations of party 
emergence. A political party can be viewed as an organizational solution to a collective 
action problem, in which participants contribute and exchange a variety of resources 
(financial, material, technical skills, time, publicity and electoral support) in order to 
generate political outcomes (public goods) that would not otherwise be achievable acting 
on an individual or ad hoc basis (Aldrich 1995; Hopkin 1996, 1999). This presupposes 
not only that a new party has access to sufficient money, media and human resources, but 
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also that it can offer policies for which there is electoral demand , a ‘relevant political 
project’ as Lucardie (2000) terms it. 
Available case study evidence suggests that there were two broad patterns of grey interest 
party formation. In the first pensioners’ parties were often founded by ‘political 
entrepreneurs’ in the purest sense of the term: individuals, often businesspeople or retired 
professionals, not previously active in party politics using their accumulated skills and 
financial resources to start up a small political organization. This pattern is illustrated by 
the foundation of SSCUP in Scotland or the Dutch AOV (van Stipdonk and van Holsteyn 
1995; Vincent 2003).  However, there is little indication as to how or why the supply of 
skilled, politically entrepreneurial individuals might vary cross-nationally or how one 
might conceptualize and measure this, making this a redundant factor for comparative 
analysis. 
In a second pattern, pensioners’ parties were formed on the basis of established interest or 
campaign groups. Such an infrastructure of interest groups provides a potential resource 
base for pensioner party formation and lowers the costs of collective action and 
organizational formation. Such interest groups also act as a training ground for individual 
political entrepreneurs with backgrounds in social activism who can act as the founders 
of grey interest parties. This pattern seems to be exemplified in the formation of early 
West European grey interest parties such as Germany’s Die Grauen, but also underlay the 
formation of Slovenia’s DeSUS in 1990. We might therefore hypothesize that where 
pensioners’ or seniors’ associations are well organized and well resourced, successful 
pensioners’ parties will tend to form. At the same time, we should note that although they 
might represent a potential resource base or sponsor for a grey interest party, strong 
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elderly interest groups may also inhibit grey party success, as they may be sufficiently 
successful in conventional and group politics as to eliminate demands for a ‘grey’ voice 
in the political arena. There is no fully adequate way of cross nationally measuring the 
organizational and civic resources of civil and public organizations representing and 
organizing pensioners and older people. For this reason, as an approximate measurement 
of the scope and strength of such organization, I therefore take the percentage of those 
over 50 recorded by the 1999 World Values Survey as saying they belonged to an 
organization providing a social welfare service for elderly people.
20
  
The start-up costs and critical mass of organizers required to form an effective new minor 
party are relatively low. In considering what level of older people’s civic self-
organization might significantly contribute to the solution of the resource mobilization 
and collective action problems of a small emergent grey party, I therefore took a 
relatively low threshold. Let us assume that a minor party in a medium sized European 
country with a total population of 10 million and a population around of 3.5 million 
citizens aged over 50 would need 2000 members to function effectively and that one in a 
hundred older members of elderly support organizations might join or actively support 
such a party. This being the case, a membership of 6 per cent in elderly support 
organizations among over 50s might be consequential for the development of an 
emergent grey interest party. Working on these assumptions, I therefore coded countries 
where over 6 per cent of citizens aged over 50 reported that they were members of elderly 
support organizations as fully in the set of countries with strong self-organization of 
older and retired people. I took (hypothetical) cases with no such membership as fully 
out of the set and set the crossover point as 3 per cent. I additionally coded one case 
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(Israel) and re-coded two others (Slovenia, Croatia) on the basis of direct case evidence 
about memberships of older people’s interest and welfare organizations in these states 
(Hinchcliff and Priestly 2001; Helpage International 2007). 
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Legacies of post-communist transition: TRANS 
This chapter seeks to undertake broad pan-European comparison encompassing both pre-
2004 EU member states and newer democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. To some 
extent the conditions identified distinguish these two groups of countries: CEE cases are, 
for example, clearly distinguished from the states of the ‘old’ West European EU by 
higher levels of new party success (party system fluidity) and higher effective national 
electoral thresholds (stemming from the widespread use of formal thresholds for 
representation in the region) (Birch 2001; Sikk 2005). The QCA method’s ability to 
distinguish different configurations of causes should, in principle, allow us to pick out 
patterns of causation distinct particular to each half of the once divided continent, if these 
exist. 
There are, however, a number of additional potentially relevant factors linked to the 
specific legacies of communism and the transition from communism that may distinguish 
the CEE and West European cases. Pensioners and older people in the region may form a 
somewhat more homogenous group in terms of income and lifestyle than those in 
established Western democracies, reflecting lower levels of differentiation of incomes 
and pension provision under state socialism and the role of the state as the main pension 
provider and income maintenance after the fall of communism (Večerník 2006; 
Vanhuysse 2006). The relative poverty of CEE may produce sharper distributional 
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conflicts between groups and sectors, aggravated by the upheavals of political and 
economic transformation. Finally, we should note that the importance and specificity of 
the temporal process of democratic transition from communism in CEE. Not only did the 
initial formation of party systems see an initial mushrooming of parties, but the 
distinction between party and interest organization was often initially blurred, 
legitimizing and encouraging political interventions by economic interest organizations 
(Lewis 2000). To take account of these factors, I therefore create an additional condition 
concerning whether a state has or has not undergone a recent transition from 
communism.
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 As European states clearly are or are not post-communist polities, this is a 
dichotomous condition coded either 1.0 or 0.  In QCA notation I term this condition 
TRANS. On balance, this bundle of post-communist specificities should favour the 
emergence of grey interest parties.  
[TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE] 
QCA analysis 
In line with recommended QCA practice, for each set of configurations I carry out three 
analyses.  These vary according to the extent to which they incorporate logically possible 
but empirically non-observed configurations of conditions (‘logical remainders’) 
alongside those found in real world cases: 1) a first analysis which excludes all non-
observed cases and thus generates a complex QCA solution; 2) a second analysis which 
includes all logical remainders alongside empirically observed combinations and thus 
generates the most parsimonious solution; and 3) an ‘intermediate solution’ which 
include some logical remainders are selected by the researcher as ‘easy counterfactuals’ 
close to empirically observed cases on the basis of ‘simplifying assumptions’ (Ragin and 
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Sonnett 2004). The inclusion in QCA minimization processes of logically possible but 
empirically non-observed configurations (cases) has been considered problematic by 
some critics of the method. However, the use of such ‘logical remainders’ is a self-
consciously artificial device intended to produce logically consistent, parsimonious 
shorthand descriptions of configurations and cases, whose plausibility as explanation 
requires assessment by the researcher.  No QCA solution, whatever its level of parsimony 
or complexity, in itself qualifies as a superior explanation and none should be regarded as 
a fully worked-out argument about causation (Rihoux and Ragin 2009: 152-5).
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  All 
QCA solutions must, moreover, be assessed in terms of both their consistency and case 
coverage. 
Having scored cases in terms of their degree of membership in the set of states with 
successful grey interest parties (GREYP) and relevant causal conditions (summarized in 
table 2.1), I began with an initial analysis that made no explicit difference between West 
and East European cases, excluding the TRANS condition, but including all other 
relevant factors: relative size of electorally relevant retired population (RETIRPOP), age-
bias of welfare spending (PENEXP), practical national electoral threshold (THRESH), 
demand for new parties (NEWP) and levels of self-organization of older people (SELF). 
However, initial analysis with logical remainders excluded, produced an essentially 
unsatisfactory solution in which none of the causal configurations had a consistency level 
above 0.7, the minimum consistency level normally recommended as acceptable (Rihoux 
and Ragin 2009). Two configurations, however, had consistency levels of 0.68 and 0.69. 
If the consistency cut-off was lowered to 0.68, these implied a single solution set.  Stated 
in the Boolean algebra used to express QCA this solutions reads 
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SELF*NEWP*THRESH*PENEXP → GREYP 
 
Expressed in more natural language, the solution suggests that a combination of higher 
elderly self-organization; higher demand for new parties; a permissive electoral threshold 
and elderly-oriented welfare spending was required for successful grey interest parties to 
emerge. In terms of fit to cases, this had coverage of 0.53 and explained only two of eight 
cases of successful grey party emergence (membership in GREYP > 0.5). Only the 
Netherlands and Israel had strong (0.5 or above) membership in the solution.
24
   
Given the limitations of this solution, I therefore moved to an analysis, which included 
the TRANS condition distinguishing established democracies from transitional post-
communist democracies alongside other relevant factors. A first, ‘complex’ analysis  on 
this basis – that is one excluding logical remainders - generated 13 causal configurations 
of which three were acceptably consistent (>0.7) with the set of successful grey interest 
parties (GREYP). Using Boolean logic these could be reduced to the following two 
causal paths: 
 
SELF*NEWP*THRESH*PENEXP*trans + 
SELF*RETIRPOP*newp*THRESH*PENEXP*TRANS → GREYP 
 
That is to say, grey interest parties have success in non-transitional (that is, West 
European) states, which combine sufficient levels of elderly self-organization (which all 
West European cases possess); permissive electoral thresholds; high demand for new 
parties; and elderly-oriented welfare state spending. In transitional (TRANS) Central and 
East European states, the solution implies, adequate self-organization and an elderly-
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oriented welfare state must be combined with a general lack of demand for new parties 
and a high, politically relevant proportion of retired people. This solution implies that 
across Europe a combination of permissive electoral thresholds, adequate civic self-
organization of older people combined with an elderly-oriented welfare state to defend is 
a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the emergence of success grey interest 
parties, as can be seen when the solution is factorized and re-expressed:  
 
SELF*PENEXP *THRESH (trans*NEWP + TRANS*RETIRPOP*newp) → GREYP 
 
The solution suggests that in Western Europe pensioners’ parties, when they have a 
degree of success, are linked to the phenomenon of voters’ seeking new anti-
establishment protest parties. In Central and Eastern Europe, where retired people 
currently form a more socially homogenous constituency than in Western Europe, the 
solution suggests, pensioners’ parties represent a purer form of interest party. This is an 
interesting finding given the generally high level of new party occurrence, which in some 
cases is so high as to imply major restructuring of the party system with each election. 
However, the pattern of coverage with this solution is again problematic. The first part of 
the unreduced solution (SELF*NEWP*THRESH*PENEXP*trans) provides a 
satisfactory solution for established Western democracies: two of the three cases of 
relatively successful pensioners’ parties (Israel, Netherlands) have high memberships 
(0.71, 0.6), while all cases with low (<0.5) pensioner party success have low membership 
in this configuration. In almost all West European cases, low membership in this causal 
configuration stems from low demand for new parties (low membership in NEWP), 
suggesting that in most West European cases the potential emergence of grey interest 
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parties is blocked by voters’ tendency to stick with  established parties.25 The only major 
incongruity is the case of Luxembourg, whose stable party system gives a very low (0.12) 
membership in the (SELF*NEWP*THRESH*PENEXP *trans configuration, but which 
is categorized as having a highly successful grey interest party, the Alternative 
Democratic Reform (ADR) party. The Luxembourg case, however, may need to be 
excluded because of the specificity of both the ADR and the Grand Duchy itself. The 
ADR’s origins as a Committee For Pensioners Justice seeking to secure better pension 
provision for private sector workers seem to qualify it, in part ,a sectoral movement of 
small businesspeople and the self-employed, rather than grey interest party seeking to 
represent all older and retired people. The ADR has, moreover, subsequently developed 
into a right-wing populist party. This appears linked with Luxembourg’s unusual status as 
a wealthy micro-state without strong nationalist traditions, factors which may have 
stabilized its party system and blocked the channels for the formation of a conventional 
radical right party, allowing the ADR to assume this role (Fehlen 2000) 
The second part of the above configuration concerning transitional democracies in 
Central and Eastern Europe (TRANS cases) is, however, much less satisfactory. The 
configuration SELF*RETIRPOP*newp*THRESH*PENEXP*TRANS covers only one 
East European case with a relatively successful grey interest party, Croatia (which has a 
membership of 0.66 in the configuration), while other cases of relatively successful grey 
interest party in Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Poland are wholly or largely  
The parsimonious solution based on the inclusion of all logical remainders served to 
highlight key aspects of the complex solution, but did not resolve problems of coverage. 
The parsimonious solution generated was: 
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NEWP * trans + TRANS*PENEXP*newp → GREYP 
 
The term NEWP*trans which covers Israel and the Netherlands confirms that successful 
grey interest parties emerge in West European states with high general incidence of new 
parties,  suggesting the importance of the stability and appeal of established parties in 
explaining West European cases.  
The second term (TRANS*PENEXP*newp implies) again suggests that in Eastern 
Europe high pension expenditure relative to other welfare spending and an absence  of 
new parties creates a favourable environment for a relatively successful grey interest 
party to emerge.  This could be interpreted as suggesting that in fluid party systems in 
CEE with very high demand for new parties, broad populist formations rather than minor 
parties will tend to benefit draw the support of voters seeking a vehicle for anti-
establishment parties voters or because that older and retired voters seeking to express 
their sectional interests at the ballot box may gravitate towards a broad protest party, 
rather than an interest party. Case knowledge suggests this explanation is intuitively 
plausible: several CEE cases with strong membership in GREYP (Czech Republic, 
Slovenia) have party systems which are relatively stable compared to other post-
communist cases, although they are relatively fluid and open when viewed in pan-
European perspective (Sikk 2005; Mainwaring, España and Gervasoni 2009). However, 
in both complex and parsimonious fsQCA solutions only Croatia has strong (> 0.5) 
membership in the second term, leaving most East European cases unexplained. Efforts 
to formulate a distinct intermediate solution, including some but not all logical, 
remainders did not resolve these issues.
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Do thresholds matter for grey interest parties?  
The low membership of some East European states with relatively successful grey 
interest parties in the solution stems very largely from their low membership in the 
THRESH condition: put more simply, some relatively successful pensioners’ parties 
emerged in East European states with relatively impermissive formal electoral thresholds 
of 5 per cent (Estonia, Czech Republic Poland). The relative success of pensioners’ 
parties in some East European states with impermissive formal electoral thresholds raises 
the possibility that electoral thresholds many not, in fact, be important for the emergence 
of  successful grey interest parties. This, we might hypothesize, is because even a 
comparatively high formal electoral thresholds of five per cent did not pose a 
psychological barrier to supporters of minor interest parties, who may be more interested 
in registering a protest and/or highlighting a neglected interest to exercise leverage on 
larger parties than gaining representation. Available case study evidence (van Stipdonk 
1995; Vincent 2003; Hanley 2010) broadly supports this interpretation.  
To address this, I deploy two further strategies: 1) analysis of the data without the 
inclusion of the THRESH condition; and 2) a Crisp Set QCA analysis (csQCA) of the 
data dichotomizing outcomes and conditions, rather than using Fuzzy Set memberships. 
Re-analysing without the THRESH and generates the following complex solution 
excluding logical remainders: 
 
SELF*RETIRPOP*newp*PENEXP*TRANS + 
SELF*retirpop*NEWP*PENEXP*trans → GREYP 
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which can be factorized to  
 
SELF*PENEXP* (RETIRPOP*TRANS + retirpop*NEWP*trans) → GREYP 
 
This suggests again that the configuration SELF*PENEXP is a necessary but not 
sufficient causal condition for the emergence of successful grey interest parties. 
However, the solution suggests, this necessary configuration must be combined with a 
high incidence of voting for new parties and a low proportion of retired people in 
Western Europe, and with a high proportion of retired people in Eastern Europe. 
However, this solution set is less satisfactory than the previous one. The absence of the 
THRESH condition excludes the Netherlands which is a weak member of the solution set 
(membership 0.25), thus producing a solution for established Western democracies, 
which covers only the Israeli case. This explains the otherwise puzzling presence of the 
retirpop condition (lack of a high proportion of retirees) in this term.
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 However, the 
solution provides no additional coverage of East European cases: again only Croatia has 
strong (>0.5) membership.  
Relaxing the set membership consistency criteria used to define positive outcomes when 
generating the truth table, a middle stage in fsQCA analysis (Rihoux and Ragin 2009), 
from 0.7 to 0.69 did produce a solution, which fitted the East European cases better. The 
complex solution thus produced was: 
 
SELF*PENEXP*(TRANS*RETIRPOP + trans*retirpop*NEWP) → GREYP 
 
 29 
 
As table 2.2 shows, this solution covered not only Israel (solution set membership of 
0.71) and Croatia (0.66), but also Poland (0.68) the Czech Republic (0.57), and Slovenia 
(0.57), achieving overall coverage of 0.56 with an overall consistency as 0.7.The solution 
suggests that successful pensioners’ parties emerge in East European states, which 
combine adequate elderly self-organization with higher levels of elderly-oriented social 
spending, but also that they can emerge in either stable or fluid East European party 
systems (as assessed by the general success of new parties, NEWP). Once again, the 
combination of adequate self-organization with high elderly-oriented social spending 
seems to be necessary, but not sufficient condition for successful grey party emergence.   
The parsimonious solution, which included all logical remainders was: 
 
SELF*PENEXP*TRANS + retirpop*(NEWP+PENEXP) → GREYP. 
 
This eliminates RETIRPOP from the term covering East European (TRANS) cases, while 
retaining a similar level of consistency (0.68) and coverage (raw coverage 0.34) and 
again including the four East European cases as strong members. 
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  It suggests that in 
post-communist cases adequate elderly self-organization combined with higher elderly-
oriented welfare spending is a sufficient condition for successful grey party emergence. 
However, the second term in the solution, covering Western Europe, again only includes 
Israel as a strong member, but not the Netherlands. However, characteristically for 
parsimonious solutions, while overall coverage was improved (0.62), consistency was 
lower (0.61). 
29
 
[TABLE 2.2 ABOUT HERE] 
 30 
The second strategy used was to re-analyze the data the original Crisp Set form of QCA 
which sees outcomes and conditions dichotomously as either present (coded 1) or absent 
(0). The dichotomization of variables central to csQCA, which sets less exacting 
standards of consistency than fsQCA, is often regarded as problematic. However, the 
simplifications required by csQCA were helpful in integrating partially successful East 
European grey interest parties in states such as Poland, Estonia and the Czech Republic 
giving a clearer overall picture of the relationship between cases. As shown in table 2.3, 
tor csQCA analysis I dichotomized fuzzy memberships in the outcomes and causal 
conditions by re-coding them either 1 (strongly present) when they were more in the set 
(membership of 0.5 or above) or 0 (weak or absent) for memberships of 0.5 or less.  
Analysis with the TOSMANA program produced a truth table shown in table 2.4) with 
only one contradictory line (configuration) represented: Luxembourg appears in the 
configuration SELF*RETIR*newp*THRESH*PENEXP*trans, which otherwise includes 
cases where grey interest parties are very weak or absent. This contradiction was resolved 
by excluding Luxembourg as a case (given the specific character of the ADR party 
discussed above) which eliminated contradictions resulting in this line being coded 0.
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The complex solution obtained by excluding logical remainders is 
 
SELF*NEWP*THRESH*PENEXP*trans+                 (Israel, Netherlands) 
SELF*RETIRPOP*NEWP*PENEXP*TRANS+     (Slovenia, Poland, Estonia, Czech R) 
SELF*RETIRPOP*THRESH*PENEXP*TRANS     (Croatia, Slovenia) 
→ GREYP 
 
[TABLES 2.3 AND 2.4 ABOUT HERE] 
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This confirms the earlier findings using fsQCA which suggest that SELF*PENEXP is a 
necessary but not sufficient causal configuration and that higher proportions of retired 
people are a relevant condition in Eastern Europe.  It also suggests that in West European 
cases both permissive a electoral system and a high incidence of new parties are needed 
for grey interest parties to have success, whereas in East European cases a high general 
incidence of new party success combined with the specificities of post-communist 
transition can offer an alternative causal path. It should be noted, however, that three of 
the four cases represented on this path (Poland, Estonia, Czech Republic) had relatively 
weak grey interest parties and that the two of most successful East European grey parties 
(Croatia and Slovenia) are covered by an alternative path. 
With the inclusion of logical remainders to obtain the most parsimonious solution, we 
obtain the following: 
 
SELF* PENEXP* NEWP +    (Israel, Netherlands, Slovenia, Estonia, Czech R, Poland      
SELF*PENEXP* TRANS      (Croatia, Slovenia, Estonia, Czech R, Poland)  
→ GREYP 
 
This parsimonious solution satisfactorily accounts for all cases. It states that the 
combination of adequate older people’s self-organization and elderly-oriented welfare 
spending with either high incidence of new parties or the specificities of post-communist 
transition will produce successful minor grey interest parties. Strikingly, all cases except 
Croatia are covered by a single causal configuration (SELF*PENEXP*NEWP) 
suggesting that the specificities of the Croatian case might be more pertinent than general 
facets of transitional post-communist democracies. Moreover, in keeping with the 
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findings in earlier fsQCA analyses suggesting that electoral thresholds may not be highly 
relevant, this parsimonious csQCA solution removes electoral thresholds and levels of 
retired population per se. A further csQCA analysis omitting the THRESH condition 
produced an identical parsimonious solution.
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  The distribution of Crisp Set outcomes 
and conditions is illustrated in figure 2.1 in a visualization produced by the TOSMANA 
program. 
 
[FIGURE 2.1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the development and relative success of pensioners’ parties as 
minor political actors across democracies across Europe and in Israel over the last two 
decades with the help of Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Its analysis suggests that grey 
interest parties have had relative (albeit often brief and episodic) success in states that 
combine adequate levels of self-organization of older people with a high level of welfare 
state spending oriented towards older and retired people. However, this combination of 
conditions is a necessary, but not a sufficient cause. In Western Europe, these findings 
suggests, it must be further combined with high general incidence of (and perhaps 
demand for) new parties. This suggests that in Western Europe the development of 
pensioners’ parties may, at least partly, need to understood in terms of the adaptation of 
established parties to socio-economic change and growing electoral demand for anti-
establishment, protest parties, rather than simply growth in ‘grey interest’ politics. It may 
therefore be necessary to integrate research agendas on the adaption of West European 
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parties’ to structural in welfare states and welfare capitalism (Kitschelt 2004; Rueda 
2005) with those on democratic disaffection in advanced democracies (Pharr and Putnam 
and 2000). 
In Central and Eastern Europe, successful pensioners’ parties seem to emerge when 
relatively high-levels of elderly-oriented welfare spending are combined with adequate 
levels of civic infrastructure for older people. In some of the analyses undertaken here, 
this was supplemented by the condition of having relatively large proportion of retired 
(economically inactive) older people in the adult population. Counter-intuitively, 
however, the general incidence of new parties, which is comparatively high in the region 
makes little difference. In CEE, therefore, the key obstacles to successful grey interest 
parties’ seems to be the limited mobilizational capacities of older people, rather than the 
ability of established parties to outcompete new challengers. This is broadly in line with 
arguments elsewhere in the literature on the region stressing the importance of transition 
‘losers’ limited self-organization abilities in shaping outcomes (Vanhuysse 2006). 
The findings in the chapter must, however, be regarded as suggestive rather than 
conclusive. Many of the fuzzy set solutions proposed are at the margins of acceptable 
consistency. This highlights both the empirical challenges of comparing minor parties on 
a broad scale and the continuing difficulties that contemporary Europe, despite its 
institutional and political convergence, poses for those wish to integrate established and 
newer European democracies within a common analytical framework. In particular, it 
may be necessary to pay closer attention the distinct dynamic of political development in 
Central and Eastern Europe. While CEE is now largely composed of stable liberal 
democracies, party-electoral competition in the region is subject to distinct temporal 
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dynamics. Conditions faced by pensioners’ parties (and other political actors) in some 
CEE states might thus be appreciably different in early, more fluid post-transition period 
than subsequently.  
Moreover, initial patterns of post-communist democratization and reform shape are, it 
seems, feeding into a new, second phase of post-communist politics defined by welfare 
and fiscal reform and a growing search among frustrated voters for new, non-
establishment parties (Vanhuysse 2006; Kitschelt and Bustoková 2009; Pop-Eleches 
2010). While echoing similar developments in established Western democracies, 
processes, this chapter suggests that these trends are running in parallel, rather than 
signalling East-West convergence around a new politics of generational conflict at the 
margins of political systems.  Further research and refinement of comparative analytical 
strategies will be needed to address all these issues more fully.
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Table 2.1: Fuzzy set memberships 
 
Country GREYP SELF RETIRPOP NEWP THRESH PENEXP TRANS 
Austria 0 1 0.92 0.16 0.5 0.77 0 
Belgium 0.2 1 1 0.1 0.92 0.43 0 
Bulgaria 0 0.22 1 1 0.5 0.44 1 
Croatia 1 1 1 0.3 0.9 0.66 1 
Czech 
Republic 0.7 1 0.74 0.6 0.33 0.57 1 
Denmark 0 0.68 0.75 0.14 0.8 0.43 0 
England 
&Wales 0.1 1 0.76 0.13 0.1 0.57 0 
Estonia 0.6 0.68 0.9 1 0.33 0.5 1 
Finland 0.3 1 0.82 0.13 0.95 0.53 0 
France 0 1 0.9 0.5 0.1 0.55 0 
Germany 0.25 0.78 0.95 0.1 0.33 0.56 0 
Greece 0 1 0.99 0.25 0.66 0.57 0 
Hungary 0.1 0.47 1 0.25 0.33 0.41 1 
Iceland 0 1 0 0.38 0.55 0.26 0 
Ireland 0 0.51 0.56 0.1 0.78 0.04 0 
Israel 0.8 1 0.25 0.8 0.92 0.71 0 
Italy 0.3 1 1 0.46 0.4 1 0 
Latvia 0 0.3 0.79 1 0.33 0.86 1 
Lithuania 0 0.05 0.71 1 0.33 0.67 1 
Luxembourg 1 1 0.9 0.12 0.79 0.67 0 
Netherlands 0.7 1 0.75 0.6 1 0.67 0 
Norway 0.25 1 0.26 0.1 0.91 0.34 0 
Poland 0.6 0.68 0.75 1 0.33 1 1 
Portugal 0.3 0.25 0.72 0.1 0.94 0.94 0 
Romania 0.1 0.35 0.52 1 0.33 0.11 1 
Scotland 0.4 1 0.76 0.25 0.93 0.57 0 
Slovakia 0 1 0.66 1 0.33 0.44 1 
Slovenia 1 1 0.85 0.8 0.5 0.57 1 
Spain 0.1 0.66 0.9 0.1 0.95 0.71 0 
Sweden 0.25 1 0.69 0.14 0.5 0.36 0 
Switzerland 0 1 0.62 0.1 0.92 0.57 0 
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Table 2.2: Fuzzy memberships in two possible solution sets 
 
 
 
Country 
 
GREYP 
SELF*THRESH*PENEXP* 
(~TRANS*NEWP+TRANS*RETIRPOP) 
SELF*PENEXP* 
(RETIR*TRANS + 
~RETIRPOP*NEWP*~TRANS) 
Austria 0 0.16 0.16 
Belgium 0.2 0.1 0 
Bulgaria 0 0.22 0.22 
Croatia 1 0.66 0.66 
Czech Republic 0.8 0.33 0.57 
Denmark 0 0.14 0.14 
England & Wales 0.1 0.1 0.13 
Estonia 0.6 0.33 0.5 
Finland 0.3 0.13 0.13 
France 0 0.1 0.1 
Germany 0.25 0.1 0.05 
Greece 0 0.25 0.01 
Hungary 0.1 0.25 0.41 
Iceland 0 0.25 0.26 
Ireland 0 0.04 0.04 
Israel 0.8 0.71 0.71 
Italy 0.3 0.4 0 
Latvia 0 0.05 0.05 
Latvia 0 0.3 0.3 
Luxembourg 1 0.12 0.1 
Netherlands 0.7 0.6 0.25 
Norway 0.25 0.1 0.1 
Poland 0.6 0.33 0.68 
Portugal 0.3 0.1 0.1 
Romania 0.1 0.11 0.11 
Scotland 0.4 0.25 0.24 
Slovakia 0 0.33 0.44 
Slovenia 1 0.5 0.57 
Spain 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Sweden 0.25 0.14 0.14 
Switzerland 0 0.1 0.1 
  
 
Note: The tilde notation denotes membership of the negation of the set (e.g. the term 
~TRANS denotes membership in the set NOT TRANS). This parallels the notation 
‘trans’ used to describe causal configurations.
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Table 2.3: Dichotomized outcomes and conditions for Crisp Set QCA analysis  
 
Country SELF RETIRPOP NEWP THRESH PENEXP TRANS GREYP 
Austria 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Belgium 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Croatia 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Czech R 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Denmark 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
England & 
Wales 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Estonia 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Finland 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
France  1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Germany 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Greece 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Hungary 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Iceland 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Ireland 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Israel 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Italy 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Latvia 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Lithuania 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Luxembourg 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Norway 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Poland 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Portugal 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Romania 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Scotland 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Slovakia 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Slovenia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Spain 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Sweden 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Switzerland 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
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Table 2.4: Truth table produced by Crisp Set QCA analysis 
 
   
SELF RETIR 
POP 
NEWP THRE
SH 
PENEXP TRANS GREYP Case(s) 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 Croatia 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Slovenia 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 Czech 
Republic 
Estonia 
Poland 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 Israel 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 Netherlands 
1 1 0 1 1 0 C Scotland 
Finland 
Spain 
Austria 
Switzerland 
France 
Greece 
Luxembour
g 
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 Italy 
Germany 
Italy 
England & 
Wales  
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 Portugal 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 Norway 
Iceland 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 Sweden 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Ireland  
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 Hungary 
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 Romania 
Bulgaria 
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 Lithuania 
Latvia 
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 Slovakia 
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Figure 2.1: Tosmana visualization of distribution of Crisp Set outcomes and 
conditions 
 
 
 
Note. Visualization excludes electoral system condition, THRESH, and case of 
Luxembourg.
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Appendices 
Table 1: Pensioners parties in Europe  
 
Belgium 1. Waardig Ouder Worden (WOW) 
Founded 1994 
European elections 1994 2.14% 
Flemish parliamentary elections 2004, 0.02% 
 
2. Algemeenouderbond Vlaanderen 
No data 
 
3. Plus party (Wallonia) 
No data 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1. Pensioners' Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Stranka Penzionera Umirovljenika BiH)  
Parliamentary elections 2002, 1.4%, 2 (of 140) in 
parliament of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Croat-Bosnian entity); 1 seat (of 42) in Bosnian 
parliament (both entities) 
Parliamentary elections 2006, 1.48%, no 
representation in parliament of Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina or Bosnian parliament 
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2. Pensioners' Party of the Republika Srpska 
(Penzionerska Stranka Republike Srpske)  
Parliamentary elections 2002, 1 seat (of 83) in 
National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska. 
Parliamentary elections 2006,  2.49% no seats in 
National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska. 
 
Bulgaria Social Solidarity Movement 
Founded May 2007 
 
Croatia Croatian Pensioners' Party (HSU - Hrvatska stranka 
umirovljenika) 
Founded 1996 
Parliamentary election 2003 – 4%, 3 seats (of 151) 
Parliamentary election 2007 -  4.1% 1 seat (of  153) 
Some sub-national (communal/municipal) 
representation 
Czech Republic Pensioners for a Secure Life (DŽJ  - Důchodci za 
životní jistoty)**  
Parliamentary election 1992***, 3.77% 
Parliamentary election 1996, 3.09% 
Parliamentary election 1998, 3.06% 
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Parliamentary election 2002, 0.86% 
Some sub-national (communal/municipal) 
representation 
 
Merged with Independent Democrats (ND) grouping 
2006 
Denmark Active Pensioners Party (Partiet Aktive Pensionister) 
Founded 1997 
Contested local elections 2005 
Has not contested national elections 
 
Estonia 1. Estonian Pensioners' Union (Eesti Pensionaride 
Liit) 
Parliamentary elections 1992, 3.71% 
Some sub-national (communal/municipal) 
representation 
 
2. Estonian Pensioners and Families Union (Eesti 
Pensionäride ja Perede Liit) Contested 1995 election 
as part of Coalition Party and Country People’s 
Alliance (KMÜ). Later renamed the Estonian 
Pensioners and Families Party (Eesti Pensionäride ja 
Perede Erakond EPPE) . Merged with the Estonia 
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People’s Party in 1999. 
 
3. Estonian Pensioners Party  
Formed 2002 
Finland 1. Joint Responsibility Party of Pensioners and 
Greens 
Parliamentary elections 1991, 0.1% 
 
2. Independent Non-Aligned Pensioners in Finland 
Parliamentary elections 1991, 0.19% 
 
3. Pensioners for the People (EKA) 
Parliamentary elections 1995, 0.2% 
Parliamentary elections 1999 0.2% 
 
4. Finnish Pensioners' Party (SEP - Suomen 
eläkeläisten puolue) 
1987, 1.22% 
Parliamentary elections 1991, 0.39% 
Parliamentary elections 1995, 0.1% 
Parliamentary elections 1999, 0.2% 
Germany The Greys – Gray Panthers Die Grauen – Grauen 
Panther) (from 2008 Grey Panther Alliance) 
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Founded 1989 (as pressure group 1975). Formally 
dissolved February 2008. Successor organization 
founded March 2008. 
 
1990 0.8%% PR lists 
1994  0.4% SMD, 0.5% PR  lists 
1998 0.3% SMD, 0.3% PR lists 
2002  0.2% SMD, 0,2 PR lists 
2005 0.0 SMD (6340 votes), PR list 0.4% 
 
2004 European elections, 1.2% 
Hungary  Pensioners' Party (NYUP -   Nyugdijasok Partja) 
Parliamentary elections 1994, 0.02% (SMD)  
Parliamentary elections 2002, 0.00%**8 (SMD) 
 
Italy 1. Autonomous Party of Pensioners 
Contested parliamentary elections 1972 
 
2. Pensioners' Party (PP - Partito Pensionati) 
 
Founded 1987 
1999 European elections 0.8%, no seats 
2004 European elections, 1.1%, 1 seat 
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2006 parliamentary elections, 0.88% Part of centre-
left Union grouping 
 
Israel 1. Older Persons and Pensioners Party of Israel 
(HaGimlain Vhakshishim BeIsrael) 
Founded 1981 
1981 parliamentary elections, 0.1% 
 
2. ‘Pensioners’ (Gimlaim) 
Founded 1988 
1988 parliamentary elections, 0.73% 
1992 parliamentary elections in coalition with Hand 
by Hand (Yad beyad) party representing ex-Soviet 
immigrants, 0.31% 
 
3. Power for Pensioners (Koah LaGimlaim), 
parliamentary elections 1999, 1.1%, no seats 
 
4. Pensioners of Israel to the Knesset (GIL -  
Gimla'ey Yisrael LaKnesset 
Founded 1996 
1996 parliamentary elections, 0.57% 
2006 parliamentary elections, 5.92%, 7 seats (of 120 
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2009 parliamentary elections 0.52% ) 
Incumbent 2006-9  
Luxembourg 1. Alternative Democratic Reform party (ADR)* 
(Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei/ Parti 
réformiste d'alternative démocratique/Alternative 
Demokratische Reformpartei) 
Founded 1987 
1989 parliamentary elections 7.3%, 4 seats (of 60) 
1994  parliamentary elections 9.0%, 5  seats 
1999 parliamentary elections 11.3%, 7 seats 
1999 European elections 9.0%, no seats 
2004 parliamentary elections  9.9% 5 seats 
2009 parliamentary elections, 8.1% 4 seats 
 
Subnational representation since 1993  
Never in national office 
 
2. Party of the Third Age (Partei vum 3. Alter, Parti 
du troisième age) 
1999 parliamentary elections 0.1% 
2004 parliamentary elections 0.4% in one 
constituency 
Now disbanded 
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Netherlands 1. General Elderly Alliance (Algemeen Ouderen 
Verbond -  AOV) 
Founded 1993 
1994 parliamentary election, 3.6% 6 seats (of 150) 
Did not contest subsequent parliamentary elections 
Represented at sub-national (provincial) level 
(provincial elections in 1995-2003). Gained seats in 
upper chamber 1995-8 on basis on provincial 
representation 
 
2. Union 55+ 
Founded 1992 
1994 parliamentary election,  0.8%, 1 seat 
Sub-national (provincial) representation in coalition 
with AOV Elderly Union (Ouderenunie). 
Formed 1998 from merger of AOV and Union 55+ 
1998 parliamentary election,  0.5% 
 
3. United Seniors Party (VSP - Verenigde Senioren 
Partij ) 
Formed 2001 from merger of Elderly Union and 
Seniors Party 
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2002 parliamentary elections 0.4% 
Limited sub-national representation 
2006 parliamentary elections 0.13% 
Active, but did not contest 2010 parliamentary 
elections. 
 
No Dutch pensioners parties ever incumbent 
 
Norway Pensioners Party (Pensjonistpartiet). 
Founded 1985.  
 
1985 parliamentary election 0.3% 
1989 parliamentary election 0.3% 
1993 parliamentary election 1.0% 
1997 parliamentary election 0.6 
2001  parliamentary election 0.7% 
2005 parliamentary election 0.5% 
2009 parliamentary elections 0.4% 
 
Never represented at national level.  
Some subnational representation. 
 
Muncipal election results  
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1987 0.2% 
1991 1.4% 
Poland 1. Legnica Association of Pensioners and Invalids 
(Polski Zw. Emerytów, Rencistów i Inw. O/W 
Legnica) Parliamentary elections 1991 - 0.04% 
 
2. Disabled, Retired Persons and Pensioners 
("Niepelnosprawni, Emeryci i Rencisci")  
Parliamentary elections 1991 - 0.04% 
 
3. National Party of Pensioners and Retired Persons 
(KPEiR -  Krajowa Partia Emerytów I Rencistów  )  
Parliamentary elections 1997 - 2.18% 
 
4. National Alliance of Pensioners and Retired 
Persons of the Polish Republic (Krajowe 
Porozumienia Emerytów i Rencistów 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej) 
Parliamentary elections 1997 - 1.63% 
 
Romania 1. Party of Pensioners of Romania (PPR -  Partidul 
Pensionarilor din Romania) 
Parliamentary election 2000 – 0.66% 
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2. Popular Party for Social Justice 
 
Russia Pensioners’ Party**** (Partiya pensionerov) 
Parliamentary elections 1999, 1.95% (national PR 
list), 0.71% (SMDs), 1 deputy elected in SMD 
Alliance of Russian Pensioners' Party (RPP - 
Rosiiskaya Partiya Pensionerov) and Russian Social 
Justice Party 
2003 Parliamentary elections 3.1% (national PR list), 
0.5% (SMDs) 
Merged with Fair Russia bloc in 2006 
 
Slovakia 1. Party of Pensioners and the Socially Dependent 
(SDSO -  Strana dôchodcov a sociálne odkázaných) 
 
Founded May 1995 
Did not contest national election 
Officially deregistered October 2005 
 
2. Pensioners’ Party of Slovakia (SDS - Strana 
dôchodcov Slovenska) 
Formed October 1995 
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Contested 2002 parliamentary elections on electoral 
list of Real Slovak National Party (PSNS). No 
deputies 
Officially deregistered October 2005 
 
Slovenia Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS 
- Demokratična stranka upokojencev Slovenije) 
Parliamentary elections 1992, contested as part of 
United List of Social Democrats (ZLSD),  1 seat 
Parliamentary elections 1996 4.32% 5 seats 
Parliamentary elections 2000, 5.17%, 4 seats 
Parliamentary elections 2004, 4.0%, 4 seats 
Parliamentary elections 2008, 7.47% , 7 seats 
 
Incumbent since 2000 
2000-4 - coalition with Liberal Democrats (LDS), 
United Social Democrats (ZSLD) and Slovene 
People’s Party. No ministerial portfolio, deputy 
speakership of parliament. 
2004- date, coalition with Slovenian Democratic 
Party (SDS), New Slovenia – Christian People's 
Party (NSi), Slovenian People's Party (SLS). 
One ministerial portfolio (defence) 
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Serbia Party of United Pensioners of Serbia (PUPS - Partija 
ujedinenich pensionera Srbije) 
Founded 2005 
2007 parliamentary elections - (in coalition with 
Social Democratic Party)  3.91% 
 
Spain  Active Pensioners’ Party (PDLPEA - Partido de los 
Pensionistas en Acción) 
 
2008 parliamentary elections  0.01% 
Sweden  Swedish Senior Citizen Interest Party (Sveriges 
Pensionärers Intresseparti) 
Founded 1987 
1991 parliamentary elections 0.04% 
1994  parliamentary elections 0.04% 
1998 parliamentary elections 1.0% 
2003 parliamentary elections 0.71% 
2006 parliamentary elections 0.52%. 
2010 parliamentary elections 0.19% 
 
Never represented at national level. 
Some subnational representation 
Comment [u1]: Update 
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Ukraine Bloc of the Party  of Pensioners of Ukraine  (BPPU 
Blok Partii Pensioneriv Ukrainy)  
- coalition of Party of Pensioners of Ukraine and 
Party of Protection of Pensioners of Ukraine 
 
2007 parliamentary elections 0.14% 
 
UK 
 
- Scotland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- England and Wales 
 
 
Scottish Senior Citizens Unity Party (SSCUP) 
Founded 2003 
2003 Scottish parliamentary elections, 0.1% in SMD, 
1.5% of regional list votes, 1 seat 
 
2007 Scottish parliamentary elections, 1.92% of 
regional list vote, no seats 
 
 
Senior Citizens Party 
2005 European elections 
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*Name since 2006. Previously ‘Action Committee – 5/6 Pensions for All’ (1987-9), 
‘Action Committee 5/6’ (1989-92), ‘Action Committee for Democracy and Pensions 
Justice’ 
**Later the Party for a Secure Life (Strana za životní jistoty) 
*** Figures for election to Czech parliament (Czech National Council) 
**** 685 votes (1245 votes in 1994) 
 
Sources:  
Parties and Elections website http://www.parties-and-elections.de;  Iecovich 2002; Israeli 
Knesset (http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_res.htm) 
Scotland: The Times, 5 May 2007; German Federal Returning Officer 
http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de; www.electionresources.org  
Statistics Norway www.ssb.no; Swedish Election Authority (www.val.se) and personal 
communication 10 January 2008; Central Electoral Commission of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina http://www.izbori.ba  ;  Czech Central Election Commission 
(www.volby.cz); Essex Election Archive (www.essex.ac.uk/elections); Russia Votes 
website (www.russiavotes.org);  Republic of Slovenia Electoral Commission 
(http://www.dvk.gov.si/ ); Republic of Serbia Electoral Commission 
http://www.rik.parlament.sr.gov.yu/index_e.htm; Slovak Ministry of the Interior as 
http://www.minv.sk/?sekcia-verejnej-spravy ; ‘Pensioners’ Party Set Up in Bulgaria’, 
Novinite news agency report, 12 May 2007, 
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=80585; Central Europe Review, 29 
November 1999 http://www.ce-review.org/99/23/estonianews23.html  
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Online were last accessed on 1 September 2010. 
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Appendix table 2: Summary of raw data 
 
 Mean 
economically 
inactive aged 
50+  as 
proportion of 
population 
aged 15+ 
1990-2007 
RETIRPOP 
50+ers 
reporting 
membership 
in elderly 
service 
organisation 
in 1999 (%) 
 
 
SELF 
Mean support 
for new 
parties in 
parliamentary 
elections 
1990-2008 
 
 
NEWP 
Practical 
national 
electoral 
threshold  
 
 
 
 
THRESH 
Mean 
spending on 
pensions as 
% of social 
spending 
(%) 1990-
2006 
 
 
PENEXP 
Austria 28.35 9.1 1.5 4 52.2 
Belgium 31.43 15.5 1.4 1.5 40.1 
Bulgaria 30.37 1.3 17.3 4 40.4 
Croatia 33.03 1.7 3.6 1.6 48.4 
Czech Rep 24.85 9.5 7.3 5 45.1 
Denmark 24.94 4.1 1.7 2.2 36.8 
England & 
Wales 
25.53 8.3 1.1 High – see 
discussion 
45.2 
Estonia 24.18 4.1 15.3 5 42.4 
Finland 26.4 14.8 0.96 1.27 43.6 
France 28.09 8.1 5.9 High – see 44.4 
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discussion 
Germany 28.97 4.7 0.9 5 44.7 
Greece 29.91 8.8 1.8 3 44.8 
Hungary 30.8 2.8 2.8 5 39.4 
Iceland 8.86 18.2 4.1 3.66 31.6 
Ireland 21.33 3.1 0.8 2.31 26.4 
Israel 15 High – see 
discussion 
9.6 1.5 50 
Italy 31.66 6.4 5.6 4 62.4 
Latvia 25.8 1.8 20 5 55.2 
Lithuania 24.17 0.3 25.9 5 49.3 
Luxembourg 28 13.2 1.1 2.27 48.4 
Netherlands 25 17.3 7.3 0.69 48.7 
Norway 15.26 15.6 0 1.56 33.6 
Poland 25.26 4.1 12.5 5 60.1 
Portugal 24.32 1.5 0.5 1.39 47.2 
Romania 20.48 2.1 13.1 5 28.9 
Scotland 25.53 8.3 2.5 1.4 45.2 
Slovakia 23.17 9.8 28.7 5 45.2 
Slovenia 27 3.1 9.8 4 44.8 
Spain 27.98 4 0.8 1.3 49.7 
Sweden 23.78 25.9 1.3 4 37.8 
Switzerland 22.42 10.6 0.5 1.5 45 
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Notes to appendix table 2 
RETIRPOP 
Calculation based on Eurostat figures 1990-2007 except for: Austria, Finland, Sweden, 
Norway, Iceland 1995-2007; Bulgaria 2000-2007; Slovenia 1996-2007; Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Poland, Romania 1997-2007.  
SELF 
Over 50s members of elderly service organizations in 1999 or nearest year – World 
Values Survey www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
NEWP 
Sources: Tavits 2007 supplemented by data in Essex Election Archive 
(www.essex.ac.uk/elections); Parties and Elections in Europe (www.parties-and-
elections.de) and Psephos – Adam Carr’s Election Archive 
(http://psephos_adam_carr.net) and information from websites of national electoral 
authorities. Listing of new parties and calculations available on request from author.  
 
THRESH 
Italicized figure denotes formal national threshold; figure in bold denotes estimate of 
effective national threshold derived from lowest vote received by parliamentary party in 
elections since 1990; all other figures estimated effective national threshold calculated 
following Taagepera (2002). Data on average district magnitude, numbers of districts 
were obtained from Birch (2001 and) World Bank Database of Political Institutions 2009 
 67 
(see Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer and Walsh 2001 )Taagepera’s formula states that 
effective national threshold is 75% divided by the square root of the total number of 
districts multiplied by the average district magnitude plus one.  
 
PENEXP 
Calculation based on Eurostat figures 1990-2007 except for Belgium:, Czech Republic, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovakia, Ireland 1995-2006; Lithuania, Slovenia 1996-2006; 
Latvia 1997-2006; Germany 1991-2007; Bulgaria 2005-6; Hungary 1996-2006; Greece, 
Poland, Romania 2000-2006. Data for Israel estimated from National Insurance Institute 
2007. Data for Croatia from Jurlina-Albibović, Mastilica, Nestić, Stubbs, Babić and 
Vončina 2006)
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Endnotes 
1
 Israel is a developed, established Western-style democracy at the periphery of the 
European Economic Area, and Scotland, a sub-state polity with a powerful legislature 
and distinct national party system. I take England and Wales as a separate case basing my 
judgments on UK parliamentary elections. I exclude Cyprus and Malta due to lack of 
case knowledge and Russia, Ukraine, Bosnia, Macedonia, Serbia, Moldova, Albania and 
Macedonia due to lack of comparable or reliable data.  
2
 For unicameral systems I take election results for the single national legislative 
chamber.   
3
 However, as Goerres (2010) notes party identification among older age cohorts in 
Western Europe, while typically stronger than that of subsequent generations, varies 
markedly with national context and continuity of national party systems. 
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4
 There is an ongoing debate in the literature about whether the reasons for the formation 
of minor parties are the same as those for their relative success (Harmel and Janda 1985; 
Kitschelt 1989; Tavits 2006). 
5
 This line of argument is advanced, for example, by Sikk and Andersen (2009) in 
relation to Estonia’s Green Party. 
6
 I diverge from this coding on this basis in only one case:  that of Romania where 
Eurostat figures indicate a very high proportion of retired people. The reason for this 
divergence seems to be that an unusually high proportion of older people in Romania 
continue to be economically active after the age of 70 (Kubitza 2004).  
7
 Tepe and Vanhuysse (2009), for example, find that while the Overall Dependency Ratio 
has a positive,  statistically significant effect in increasing macro pension spending as a 
proportion of GDP, the effect is weakened if elderly population is defined as those aged 
over 55, rather than those aged over 65. When the dependent variable is recast as pension 
generosity (pension spending per retiree relative to GDP) both measure of elderly 
population have a positive effect, although it is weaker when the more inclusive 55+ 
category is used.  
8
  Slovenia’s DeSUS, for example, estimated that it gained about 15 per cent support 
among older and retired voters (DeSUS 2006), while, exit polls suggest that the Czech 
DŽJ party gained no more than 13 per cent of pensioners’ voters during its best national 
election performance (in 1992) (Večerník 2006: 6) 
9
 As a robustness test additional fsQCA analyses were carried assuming that grey interest 
parties would attract slightly lower and slightly higher proportions of the elderly and 
retired population (10 per cent and 15 per cent), which has the effect, respectively, of 
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lowering and raising the overall proportion of such voters in the adult population 
assumed to facilitate grey party success. These analyses produced near identical solutions 
to those reported below with near identical coverage and consistency. The only difference 
found was that the ‘complex solution’ produced for West European cases additionally 
incorporated the retirpop term (fewer older people) when grey parties were assumed to 
win only 10 per cent of older voters’ support.  However, this disappeared in the more 
parsimonious ‘intermediate’ version. The overall robustness of fsQCA results can partly 
be gauged from the consistency scores reported (Skaaning 2007).  
10
 Demands for left distributive policies driven by population ageing, Kitschelt (2004: 6) 
suggests will partially damp down demands for socially liberal free market policies 
generated by other social changes, as older voters tend to be socially less liberal and more 
‘materialist’ in outlook.  
11
 The sharpness of sectoral and generational divisions has often been seen as varying 
according to national welfare regimes. For example, conservative corporatist Bismarkian 
welfare states with generous decentralized, welfare systems have been seen as facing the 
sharpest divisions between outsiders and insider groups such as older, unionized, male 
workers who benefit from employment security and unreformed pension systems.  Tepe 
and Vanhuysse (2010) find that the pro-elderly spending bias and the pro-new social 
risks spending bias of OECD welfare states are negatively correlated (both in levels and 
in change over time), indicating trade-offs between spending priorities. However, welfare 
regime type does not significantly affect the spending bias of countries towards new 
social risks. 
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12
 The causal relationship between age group related welfare spending and the success of 
grey interest groups  normally raises issues  of causal direction: it could be logically 
plausible that,  if associated, successful pensioners’ parties might have caused higher 
levels of welfare spending on older groups by, for example, suggesting to mainstream 
politicians that there discontented  ‘grey vote’. Indeed, there might be a pattern of circular 
causality (‘feedback effects’) However, relatively successful grey interest parties have so 
far had too weak and ephemeral a political presence to exercise the type of long-term 
influence required to significantly to impact pension and welfare spending patterns, 
which are, in any case in part the path dependent products of decisions taken during early 
welfare state formation and often highly resistant to political action in the present (Lynch 
2006; Inglot 2008). 
13
 The crudity of the measure lies in the fact that it also partly captures numbers of 
pensioners. However, the distribution and ranking of countries into cases with higher and 
lower elderly welfare bias is broadly consistent with more sophisticated measures of age 
bias in welfare state spending such as such as Lynch’s  (2006: 24) ENSR index for 
Western OECD members. The main anomaly is that this crude measure underestimates 
the elderly age-bias Lynch identifies in the welfare spending in Greece and Portugal. 
14
 I include spending for all type of pensions defined in Eurostat statistical compilations 
as  ‘periodic cash benefits under the disability, old-age, survivors and unemployment 
functions…social benefits: disability pension, early-retirement due to reduced capacity to 
work, old-age pension, anticipated old-age pension, partial pension, survivors' pension, 
early-retirement benefit for labour market reasons’ (Eurostat 2010). 
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15
 As a robustness test additional fsQCA analyses were carried out reducing the level of 
pension expenditure required for full membership of PENEXP to 50 per cent and 40 per 
cent as a proportion of social spending.  These analyses produced near identical solutions 
to those reported below with near identical coverage although consistency was somewhat 
lower. The only difference found was that when the THRESH (effective national 
thresholds) condition was excluded, the solution produced for West European  (trans) 
cases additionally incorporated the retirpop term (lower proportion of older people). This 
counter-intuitive term appears to reflect the influence on the solution of the Israeli case – 
one of only three non-East European cases more in than out of GREYP set -  once the 
criteria for full membership in PENEXP are lowered in a way that makes almost all cass 
full (1.0) members. 
16
 Many scholars take the effective threshold for an electoral district of mean magnitude 
as an indication of a national electoral system's permissiveness. However, as Taagepera 
(2002) notes the national effective threshold may be significantly lower as emergent new 
parties' support is likely to be higher in some electoral districts than others. I diverged 
from applying this approach in two cases: France and England and Wales which elect 
legislators using majoritarian electoral systems Single Member Districts (SMDs), 
Taagepera’s formula suggests an effective national threshold of around 1.5 per cent. 
However, I judged the degree of vote concentration required to win a seat in such systems 
was too demanding for an emergent interest-based party to achieve and I therefore coded 
these cases as having highly impermissive electoral systems. In Scotland empirical 
evidence suggests a lower effective national threshold operates for the regional PR list 
seats than that implied by the Taagepera formula. In this case I took the lowest vote 
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obtained by a parliamentary party (1.4 per cent, Scottish Senior Citizens' Unity Party in 
2003) as the effective national threshold.  
17
 Electoral systems in both Western and Eastern Europe generally remained stable in the 
period analyzed (Birch 2001). However, in the three cases (Italy, Bulgaria, Romania) 
where there were wholesale changes of electoral system type, 
 
 I based my coding on the 
electoral system used for most elections across the period. In other cases where there 
were limited changes to formal national thresholds or to magnitudes of electoral districts, 
I took averages over the period as the basis of fsQCA coding.   
18
 For initial attempts to develop a measure distinguishing these two types of volatility 
more directly see Mainwaring, España, A. and Gervasoni (2009) and Powell and Tucker 
(2009). 
19
 Tavits (2007); supplementary material is online at 
http://tavits.wustl.edu/SupplementalMaterial.pdf. Tavits and Sikk use slightly different 
criteria to assess whether a party is genuinely new and make somewhat different 
empirical assessments of certain parties, leading to different scorings for some national 
elections. However, they both follow the same broad principle of counting parties as 
‘new’ when they contest parliamentary elections for the first time. I use Tavits’ data as 
they are easily available online. 
20
 1999 was chosen because it was a point mid-way through the period studied and a year 
for which data was available for all cases. The WVS figures used as a proxy for elderly 
self-organization here generally match other WVS items capturing levels of civic 
engagement and associational membership, both among older people and populations. 
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21
 The codings here are thus not necessarily inconsistent with findings about CEE 
pensioners’ general lack of protest mobilization (Vanhyusse 2006: 118-9) as it concerns 
organizational infrastructure. More in-depth empirical study of older people’s 
involvement in contentious politics is arguably required to substantiate and clarify this 
generalization. 
22
 A similar approach is taken to communist legacies by Schneider (2009) in his cross-
regional fsQCA study of democratization. 
23
 As Rihoux and Ragin (2009: 152-5) argue, by incorporating ‘logical remainders’, QCA 
is simply doing explicitly and transparently what most comparative methods including 
regression analysis do implicitly. Any comparison aiming at some degree of generalized 
explanation will make similar, but implicit assumptions about logically possible but 
empirically unobserved cases. 
24
 Analyzed with the inclusion of logic remainders to produce a parsimonious solution 
(again with the very low consistency cut-off of 0.68) yielded the causal argument: 
NEWP*THRESH. This suggested that a combination of permissive practical electoral 
thresholds and demand for new parties was sufficient to account for the emergence of 
successful grey interest parties. This had a similar coverage, although one additional case 
of relatively successful grey party formation (Slovenia) was covered. However, there was 
an additional incongruity: Bulgaria a country without an electorally successful 
pensioners’ party was also a strong member of this parsimonious solution. Although this 
solution was consistent with three of the five most successful grey interest parties, its 
broader lack of consistency and failure to explain all but one the cases of more successful 
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grey interest parties in Eastern Europe suggested that it was necessary to incorporate 
post-communist transition as an additional condition. 
25
 The exceptions are Ireland and Iceland, whose low memberships in the configuration 
stem more from their low membership of PENEXP - i.e. the strong absence of elderly-
bias in welfare state spending; Italy where the existence of a formal electoral threshold of 
4 per cent seems to play a role; and France whose majoritarian electoral system is coded 
as highly impermissive.  
26
 The most plausible set of such assumptions - based on the theoretically-derived 
expectations outlined earlier paper – simply reproduced the complex solution. The 
assumptions used were that RETIRPOP, SELF, THRESH and PENEXP would contribute 
to the outcome when present and that NEWP and TRANS might or might not do so. 
27
 The parsimonious and intermediate versions of this solution had similarly limited 
coverage and are not reported here. 
28
 Set memberships in parsimonious solution for the four cases are identical to those 
reported above for the complex solution. 
29
 An intermediate solution incorporating some logical remainders - assuming that 
PENEXP and SELF would contribute to successful grey interest parties, while other 
conditions might or might not do so - simply reproduced the complex solution. 
30
 An alternative would be to re-code Luxembourg as not having a successful grey 
interest party, re-classifying the ADR.  However, the solution terms obtained would be 
identical. 
31
 The complex solution obtained was PENEXP*SELF* (TRANS*RETIRPOP + 
trans*NEWP) → GREYP, which parallels the complex solution obtained including 
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THRESH but allows Croatia to be included in the same configuration as other East 
European cases.  
32
 For example, the use of ‘two stage’ QCA (Schneider and Wagemann 2003) or Caren 
and Panofsky’s (2005) modification of QCA to incorporate temporality. 
 
